Electromagnetic analysis (EMA) has aroused increasing interest in the side-channel cryptanalysis community. It follows differential power analysis (DPA) constituting a real threat to the security of many cryptographic devices. A design-time security evaluation methodology is proposed to examine electromagnetic (EM) leakage characteristics of secure processors. This EM simulation methodology involves system partitioning, current flow simulation, and data processing to simulate direct EM emissions or modulated emissions sensed by different types of field sensors. The proposed simulation methodology can be easily employed in the framework of an integrated circuit (IC) design flow to perform a systematic EM characteristics analysis.
Introduction
Cryptographic devices are becoming ubiquitous, from pay-TV through mobile phones, PDA to smart cards. Opponents can retrieve key information by observing side-channel leakage, such as timing of computation [1] , power consumption [2] , as well as electromagnetic radiation [3] from the devices when embedded processors are computing cryptographic algorithms. In the EM side-channel, the device under attack emits different amounts of EM emission during the computation depending on the instructions and data being executed. Some sophisticated statistical techniques such as differential electromagnetic analysis (DEMA) [3, 4, 5] are used to retrieve secret key information. DEMA, very similar to DPA, involves hypothesising a secret key (often part of the key bits), taking a large of number of measurement of EM traces, dividing these traces into two partitions according to the intermediate results, averaging each partition to remove noise, and finally computing the differential trace (the difference between the average of the two partitions). If the hypothetic secret key is false, the differential trace is close to zero. If the hypothetic secret key is true, the differential trace exhibits peaks, indicating points where the key bits were manipulated. By this means, DEMA can detect variations in EM emission so small that individual key bits can be identified.
In order to protect secure processors from side-channel analysis attacks, a huge amount of research efforts has been made in an attempt to hide or avoid the correlation between the data being manipulated and the side-channel information. To evaluate these research efforts, we have proposed the design-time security evaluation against EMA attacks, which aims to examine data-dependent EM characteristics of secure processors, so as to assess their security level against EM side-channel analysis attacks. Compared to common industrial practise where the security evaluation of the secure device designs could only be performed after chips are manufactured, this design-time security evaluation can help designers to spot design overlooks or weaknesses at an early stage, so as to reduce re-spin cost and time to market. This proposed design-time security evaluation methodology for EM side-channel analysis first partitions an electronic system under test into two parts: the chip and the package. The package is simulated in an EM simulator and modelled with lumped parameters R, L and C. The chip incorporating the package lumped parameters is then simulated in circuit simulators. This mixed-level simulation obtains current consumption of the system under test accurately and swiftly. Next, the security evaluation methodology involves a procedure of data processing on the current consumption to simulate EM emissions. Different methods of data processing are required to target different types of sensors used in attacks. Furthermore, to simulate modulated EM emissions, demodulation in amplitude or angle is incorporated into the simulation flow.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the origin of EM emissions from ICs, laying the theoretical foundation of the simulation methodology. In Section 3, we elaborate our simulation methodology of system partitioning and simulation procedures incorporating different types of EM emissions and different field sensors. In Section 4, we demonstrate simulation results for two processors on our test chip from which data dependent EM characteristic is successfully identified and verified by measurement results. Section 5 presents a brief conclusion.
Background

Origin of EM Emissions
To comprehend the origin of electromagnetic (EM) emissions, we must know Maxwell's Equations. The four equations form a complete description of electric and magnetic fields and their interaction. The first equation is Gauss's law for electricity, which says that electric field diverges from electric charge. The second is Gauss' law for magnetism, which says there are no isolated magnetic poles. The third equation is Faraday's law of induction, which says that electric fields are produced by changing magnetic fields. The last one is Ampere's law, which says that circulating magnetic fields are produced by changing electric fields and by displacement currents in dielectric.
Where, In a word, Maxwell's Equations explain the origin of EM radiation: the waves of interrelated changing electric and magnetic fields propagate through space. Referring to the third and forth equations, we know that in an integrated circuit, it is changing current flowing in a closed loop that produces changing magnetic field which in turn produces changing electric field, so on and so forth.
Near and Far Fields
Circuits that cause fields can be sorted into four basic classes [6] : electrostatic, magnetostatic, time-variant electric, and time-variant magnetic circuit.
The electrostatic circuits are simply fixed distribution of charges. A simple case is the charge dipole, where two equal and opposite charges are spaced some distance apart. There is an electric field which does not vary with time (i.e., E is constant in time) but no magnetic field (i.e., H is zero). Magnetostatic circuits consist of DC current loops. This is the dual to the electrostatic case. There is a constant magnetic field H which falls off with the cube of distance, but no electric field (i.e., E is zero). For both the electrostatic and magnetostatic cases, there is no wave so that field information does not propagate. A time-variant electric circuit, for example a dipole driven by an AC (Alternating Current) voltage source, has charges built up and reverse at the open ends harmonically. Since dq/dt = I, there is a current flows back and forth, generating electric and magnetic field. In spherical coordinates, as shown in Figure 1 , the magnetic field generated by the displacement current I is:
Time-variant electric circuit
where Φ represents the vector direction, β denotes a constant of 2π/λ where λ is the wavelength.
The electric field is derived using Maxwell's equations as:
where r and θ represent that the electric field E has two components along the r and θ direction in spherical coordinates.
The electric field components vary as 1/(βr) 3 , 1/(βr) 2 , 1/βr, while magnetic field varies as 1/(βr) 2 and 1/βr. Whether βr 1or 1 will determine r belongs to the range of near field or the range of far field.
• Case I. Near Field When βr 1, i.e. r λ/2π,
H E, electric field dominates.
• Case II. Far Field When βr 1, i.e. r λ/2π,
Note that
E and H are orthogonal to each other and are both orthogonal to the direction of propagation. The relative strength of electric and magnetic field is fixed, which is defined as the wave impedance. Electric and magnetic field are jointly referred to as electromagnetic field in far field.
Time-variant magnetic circuit
A time-variant magnetic circuit as the fourth type of EM causing circuit is a dual to the third type. A current loop excited by an AC source carries current I generates electric and magnetic field. In spherical coordinates as shown in Figure 2 , the magnetic and electric fields generated by the current loop mirror those for the dipole:
The magnetic field components vary as 1/(βr) 3 , 1/(βr) 2 , 1/βr, while electric field varies as 1/(βr) 2 and 1/βr. • Case I. Near Field When βr 1, i.e. r λ/2π,
H E, magnetic field dominates.
E and H are orthogonal to each other and are both orthogonal to the direction of propagation. They are now together referred to as electromagnetic field.
From the above description, EM radiation is determined by two things:
• The source -whether it is open ended (dipole) or closed (current loop). If the source is a current loop, which is applied in an IC circuit, measuring H in near field is more efficient than measuring E.
• The measurement distance -in the near field or far field.
However in each case, the measured element strength (E or H) is proportional to current I. This is the fundamental reason why current signal is used to represent EM field (in some cases, changing rate of the current are used and the reason will be explained in next section).
Simulation Methodology for EM Analysis
System Partitioning
The most straightforward way to simulate EM waves propagating in a circuit is to use a 3D or planar EM simulator, which involves solving Maxwell's equations for the electric and magnetic vector fields in either frequency domain or time domain. However a full-wave 3D simulator incorporating characterised nonlinear 1 semiconductor devices is too time consuming to be practical for chip-level analysis.
Based on equation (5)- (16), electromagnetic signal strength (E or H) is always proportional to current I which causes the emission. By collecting the current I, we can track the EM signals of interest. Therefore a circuit simulator can be used for EMA simulation, which solves for voltage and current according to Kirchhoff's voltage and current laws in a network of lumped elements. It is much faster in dealing with a large scale CMOS integrated circuit than an EM simulator. However, the accuracy of the circuit simulation is limited by the accuracy of lumped element models and its validity is limited by range of frequencies, geometries of the implementation.
Our simulation approach partitions an electronic system into two parts. The first part is the chip, simulated in circuit simulators like SPICE, which is fundamentally flawed because wave coupling is not accurately represented even if transmission lines are used for the interconnects. However, the chip dimensions are small enough (compared to the wavelength) to tolerate the errors 2 . The second part is the package and even the printed circuit board (PCB), which have larger dimensions and should be simulated accurately through an EM simulator and be modelled with lumped components (R, L and C). The lumped elements will then be incorporated into the same circuit simulator to achieve accurately and swiftly the response of the entire system. 1 Some examples of nonlinear components are Diode, BJT and MOSFET. 2 The velocity of electromagnetic propagation is limited by the laws of nature, and in silicon-dioxide it is approximately 1.5 × 10 8 m/s . The rule of thumb is that we usually need to consider transmission-line effect when the edge length is shorter than three times the longest dimension of a device. Fast signal edges in smart card chips with an edge rate of under 1ns have to be considered as "high speed" only when the longest chip dimension is beyond 50mm. Smart card chips are typically < 5mm, so wires are never longer than 10mm, but even this is unlikely. Figure 3 demonstrates the EMA simulation procedure over an IC design. The EM analysis simulation flow is similar to that of power analysis which measures the global current of a device [7] . However, EM analysis may focus on a smaller block such as the ALU or the memory. In this case, a Verilog/SPICE co-simulation can be used where the partitioning function provides an easy means to select the desired block(s) to test. With Verilog/SPICE co-simulation, various instructions or cryptographic algorithms are easily executed and modified through testbench files written in Verilog. Accurate simulation of current consumption is achieved in the SPICE-like simulation. Once the current data I(t) for the desired block(s) or a whole processor is collected, it is passed to MATLAB™ and is processed to implement DEMA according to the sensor types and emission types. The data process procedure for EM analysis is shown in the shadowed box in Figure 4 . It includes synchronising and re-sampling of two sets of current consumption data when the processor under test is computing with different operands. We then perform signal processing on each set of current consumption data according to the types of field sensors to measure and according to the types of EM emissions to be measured.
Simulation Procedure
EM field measurement equipment
EM field sensors are divided into those detecting electric and those detecting magnetic fields in near-field, or those detecting far-field EM-field. In EM analysis attacks on small devices with weak EM emissions such as a smart card, near-field sensors are more appropriate. Near-field magnetic field sensors generally measure the near-field magnetic component around current-carrying conductor where B ∝ I. The simplest magnetic field sensor is a loop of wire. An EM field is induced in the loop due to a change in magnetic flux through the loop caused by a changing magnetic field produced by an AC current-carrying conductor. This is the transformer effect. The induced voltage is:
where M denotes the mutual inductance between the sensor and the concerned circuit.
This type of field sensor senses the change of magnetic flux, so we use current derivatives dI/dt to track EM emission. Simulation for this type of sensor involves differential calculus on current consumption data.
There are also far-field electromagnetic field sensors such as log-periodic antennas. They generally measure far-field electromagnetic field and often work with other equipment to harness modulated emissions. For example, an amplitude modulation (AM) receiver tuned to a clock harmonic can perform amplitude demodulation and extract useful information leakage from electronic devices [4] . This is not an exhaustive list of field sensors, but provides a view that different types of sensors measure different types of field, so that require different approaches in EM simulations.
Direct vs modulated EM emissions
Another challenge in EMA simulation is the types of EM emissions: direct emissions and modulated emissions [4] . Depending on the types of EM emissions in EMA attacks: direct emissions or modulated emissions, EMA simulation may require demodulation of corresponding manners of the modulation.
Low-pass filtering effect of EM sensors
As the last step of data processing procedure as shown in the shadowed box in Figure 4 , a low-pass filter is needed to apply on the two sets of processed current consumption data. Considering the inductance in field sensors, and the load resistance from connected instruments (e.g. an amplifier or an oscilloscope), an RL low-pass filter is formed. Its 3dB cutoff 3 frequency is calculated as
Finally, the DEMA trace is performed by subtracting one EMA trace from another. Security weakness will be manifested as pulses in the DEMA trace, revealing data-dependent EM characteristics of the tested design.
Evaluation Results of The Simulation Methodology
EM Simulation Setup
DEMA simulation has been carried out on a test chip, fabricated in UMC 0.18µm six metal CMOS process as part of the G3Card project [8, 9] . The test chip contains five 16-bit micro-controller processors with different design styles. This paper addresses the synchronous processor (S-XAP) and the dual-rail asynchronous processor (DR-XAP).
In this test, we target simple instructions (e.g. XOR (exclusive OR), shift, load, store etc) which can give a good indication of how the hardware reacts to operations of cryptographic algorithms. A short instruction program runs twice with operands of different Hamming weight.
The first run sets the I/O trigger port high by storing '1' into memory, computes '00 XOR 55', and sets the I/O trigger port low by storing '0' into memory, while the second run sets the I/O port high, computes '55 XOR 55', and sets the I/O port low.
EM Simulation on a Synchronous Processor
VCS/Nanosim from Synopsys™ is used in this test to collect the current consumption data, and MATLAB programs developed by the authors are used for signal processing as described in Section 3.2. Figure 5 shows the EMA simulation result over the S-XAP processor. We simulate direct EM emission picked up by an inductive sensor, which is supposed to be several hundred microns in diameter to cover the entire processor. Global current is therefore collected in the simulation. If intended to examine internal functional blocks (e.g., ALU or register files etc), corresponding branch currents should be collected instead. On the graph we plot the EM traces of the processor for '00 XOR 55' and '55 XOR 55', as well as the differential EM plot of EMA1 -EMA2 (DEMA). The EM traces (EMA1 and EMA2) are superposed and appear as the top trace in Figure 5 . The differential EM trace (DEMA) is shifted down from the centre by 6 × 10 11 unit to clearly show its relative magnitude. The EM emission magnitude is computed through dI/dt as discussed in Section 3.2.1, thus has units of µA/s. The measurement of EM emissions on the same processor performing the same code is shown in Figure 6 . The EM emissions are picked up by an inductive sensor over 5000 runs to average out the ambient noise (although 200 runs are enough), then are monitored on an oscilloscope. The inductive head in use has resistance R = 5.4Ï, inductance L = 9µH. When delivering power into a 4KÏ load, the 3dB cutoff is calculated as 70MHz. The measurement results demonstrate the EM traces are around 50MHz, complying to the explanation of the RL low-pass filtering effect in Section 3.2.3, and the parameters have been used in the EMA simulation shown in Figure 5 . Both the measurement and the simulation results observe the differential trace peaks when the processor is executing XOR logic operations. This means data dependent EM emission is leaking information related to key bits at those instances, thus means vulnerability in EMA attacks. The agreement in the measurement and the simulation results verified the validity of the proposed EMA simulation approach. The simulated EM traces in Figure 5 are lower in shape around STORE operations in original traces (EMA1 and EMA2) compared to those measured, as the simulation includes no power contribution from memory accesses, due to lack of memory models.
EM Simulation on an Asynchronous Processor
Similar simulation is performed on processor DR-XAP which is designed in a dual-rail asynchronous style with return-to-zero handshaking protocol. This balanced circuitry and coding protocol was believed to be secure since power consumption should be data independent [9] . Figure 7 shows the EMA simulation result. On the graph we superpose the EM traces of the processor for '00 XOR 55' and '55 XOR 55', and plot the DEMA trace at the bottom. The DEMA trace exhibits a wobble at only about 1% magnitude of that of the original traces (EMA1 and EMA2). This matches with the projection that asynchronous design with dual-rail coding and return-to-zero handshaking is much more secure against side-channel analysis attacks.
The measurement result in Figure 8 also indicates no On the other hand, EMA simulation on modulated emissions demonstrates more intriguing results. We collected the current consumption data from the asynchronous processor as we did in direct emission simulation, then we processed the data with amplitude demodulation. The carrier used to demodulate the EM signal is the 17th clock harmonic (The asynchronous XAP executes at a speed around 10 to 50MHz. Here take a carrier whose fundamental is 20MHz). From the simulation results shown in Figure 9 , we observed greater level of differential signals compared to Figure 7 . The peak to peak of the differential trace (DEMA) is about 32% of the peak to peak of the original signals (EMA 1 and EMA 2). Figure 10 . The pulse in subplot (a) is the modulating signal. Subplot (b) shows the AM modulation with a sinusoidal carrier and its product detection based demodulation [10] . The pulse appears on the negative side of the modulation, and demodulated as a negative pulse. Subplot (c) shows the modulating signal with same magnitude and period, but time shifted a bit. Subplot (d) shows its AM modulation with the same sinusoidal carrier as in (b) . The pulse appears on the positive side of the modulation, and demodulated as a positive pulse. This sign opposition in the demodulated signals can result in large peaks in their differential trace. In order to successfully produce sign opposition in the demodulated signals, the time shift should be around half period of the carrier signal or its odd multiples. Figure 9 , it is data dependent timing in the program execution that caused significant peaks in the differential trace, although no obvious time shift is observed in the raw traces (AM demodulated EMA 1 and 2), because low-pass filtering has obscured the time shift. We however see higher peaks in Figure 9 around the second STORE operation, as a result of the time shift accumulated in previous operation. This data dependent timing caused EM information leakage is much higher in the tested asynchronous design than the synchronous design, as a result of the lack of clock i.e. synchronisation. The amplitude demodulated EMA simulation reveals an unexpected weakness in the tested asynchronous design against EM side-channel attacks, which provides a good example of usefulness of the design-time evaluation in the secure processor design flow.
Conclusions and Future Work
A simulation methodology for EMA has been proposed on the basis of an analytical investigation of EM emissions in CMOS circuits. This simulation methodology involves simulation of current consumption with circuit simulators and signal processing on data of current consumption with MATLAB. The proposed simulation methodology can be easily employed in the framework of an integrated circuit design flow. It moves one step closer to a complete security-aware design flow for cryptographic processors.
Experiment carried out on test processors have demonstrated that the synchronous processor under test reveals data dependent EM characteristics in DEMA of direct EM emissions, while the asynchronous processor under test reveals data dependent timing which is visible in DEMA of amplitude modulated EM emissions.
Future work about EMA simulation includes analysis in frequency domain. Misalignment of traces in the time domain has forced attackers to analyse signals captured in the frequency domain [11] . In addition, frequency analysis may reveal information not available with time domain analysis, such as loops and other repeating structures in an algorithm. EMA simulation in frequency domain may simply require additional fast Fourier transform (FFT) in the signal processing to convert traces from the time domain to the frequency domain. Another challenge in future EMA simulation is the well-known parametric effects caused by process variations in deep-submicron CMOS processes. Monte Carlo optimisations and statistical analysis [12] are under investigation to cope with these effects.
